ABOUT 1 MONTH AGO • 14 MIN READ

The Spymasters - Issue #26 - Insider Threat Weekly

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Well, this has been a heavy week. I've been down a rabbit hole on some of the darkest cults being exposed around child exploitation, and child safety in general. There'll be more on this that I put out soon.

I've started volunteering for an organisation that helps link children to fathers who have potentially abandoned them in developing countries, fathers who most likely conceived them through the sex tourism trade. Unfortunately, the organisation I'm volunteering with finds allegations of child sexual abuse material from people directly tied to it. We try to link those people with the legal authorities so they can investigate further, and that's proving extremely difficult.

So this intro is a little longer this week. It's a bit heavy. It's been a big week. But it's nice to be working and giving back, because child predators like this are the greatest insider threat to human society.


Thumbnail image: Faire​

Headline: The Spymasters

August Hanning, former head of Germany's BND

  • Germany's federal prosecutor arrested Hanning on 6 October on suspicion of treasonous espionage, attempted treason and espionage. He ran the BND, Germany's foreign intelligence service, from 1998 to 2005.
  • His former chief of staff, named only as Manfred D., later served as chief of staff to Hanning's successors from 2012 to March 2026.
  • Prosecutors allege that from 2010 Manfred D. passed Hanning nearly 2,000 BND documents for payment, many of them classified.
  • Hanning allegedly used the material to write an analysis for an officer of a foreign intelligence service. Prosecutors haven't named the country.

David Rush, former senior US intelligence official

  • Rush pleaded guilty on 6 October to defrauding the US government of about $194 million. He held a senior executive post and a Top Secret clearance at an agency widely reported to be the CIA.
  • He invented government programmes, including a fake classified "Special Access Program", to move federal money into his own accounts. A search of his home found 298 gold bars and $2.1 million in cash.
  • He also admitted that in 2025 he gave a foreign government identifying details of a US clandestine human source. He is sentenced on 28 January.

What links these two stories is people in very senior positions within government agencies, who go through some of the strictest vetting we have today. It's unclear whether either of them was under a continuous vetting process or the older point-in-time process. Either way, these are the strictest vetting processes in the world, and they're still missing things. Continuous monitoring is being pushed more and more, and it's something I recommend organisations do for people in these really critical positions, particularly in government and federal agencies. It should also be considered for highly sensitive or senior positions in areas like critical infrastructure. A small change to someone's financial situation or family situation can have a drastic impact on them, and lead to them becoming an insider risk.

Source: Arrests for suspected treasonous espionage, spying out state secrets, attempted treason, and espionage (Federal Public Prosecutor General, Germany) Source: Former federal employee pleads guilty to defrauding the federal government of approximately $194 million (US Department of Justice) Source: CIA officer arrested with gold bars admits he exposed secret intelligence source to a foreign official (NBC News)​


Insider Scoop: The Shortcut Through Hong Kong

  • In late May, UPS was shipping a cockpit canopy and a weapons-bay door from an F-35 back to the US from Australia, for inspection, repair or disposal. Both are coated in radar-absorbing stealth material.
  • The freight forwarder, DSV, emailed that the parts fell under US arms export rules and must not pass through certain places. The shipment left late, and a UPS employee rerouted it through Hong Kong to save time.
  • Bloomberg reports the employee never saw the warning. It may have gone into a different IT system from the one they used. Chinese authorities then took the parts.
  • The F-35 Joint Program Office confirmed a "shipment issue of unserviceable F-35 Lightning II components" and says it is working to recover them. Australia's Defence Minister, Richard Marles, said he understood no sensitive parts were involved.

This to me seems like an opportunistic find for China, if these parts were actually in the shipment, which I guess is still unconfirmed at this point in time. My question is, with such highly classified, top secret material, why is it not being shipped with a courier that sees it from one end to the other? Is it because these parts are sent for service so often that it wouldn't be financially viable? It's hard to believe there would be a gap like this, given how sensitive it is, how long Australia has been working with the US on these aircraft, and that these parts are supposedly sent back and forth all the time.

Source: UPS worker missed email, letting China get F-35 parts (Bloomberg) Source: Chinese authorities reportedly in possession of F-35 components in Hong Kong (CNBC)​


Crime Roundup

The nuclear safety engineer and the Houthis.

  • Ashton Ellaboudy, 51, an engineer in the Department of Energy's Nuclear Safety Division at the Hanford site in Washington state, was arrested on 1 October. He is charged with attempting to provide material support to the Houthis.
  • Prosecutors allege that in September 2025 he used an official passport from a previous government job to travel through Oman into Yemen. He also bought chemicals and parts used to build explosives and drones.
  • The "Houthi contact" he was helping with communications gear was an FBI informant. Prosecutors say he had two guns and explosive material when arrested. A judge has kept him in custody.

Source: Department of Energy employee arrested in Washington state on charges of attempted material support (US Attorney, E.D. Washington)​

The engineer who held his own network to ransom.

  • Daniel Rhyne, 59, a core infrastructure engineer at a New Jersey industrial company, was sentenced to 32 months in prison, announced 5 October.
  • In November 2023 he deleted 13 domain admin accounts, changed 301 user passwords and locked the company out of 254 servers and 3,284 workstations.
  • He then emailed staff demanding 20 bitcoin, about $750,000 at the time, and threatened to shut down 40 more servers a day.

Source: Former employee of industrial company sentenced to 32 months in prison for computer attack and extortion (US Attorney, D. New Jersey)​

The banker who unblocked the fraud flags.

  • Gerardo Aquino, 40, a former TD Bank employee in Florida, pleaded guilty on 6 October to money laundering conspiracy and taking bribes as a bank employee.
  • From 2022 to 2023 he opened fraudulent accounts, including 86 at one Miami address, issued hundreds of debit cards, and unblocked cards the bank had restricted for suspected fraud.
  • More than $4.8 million was laundered to Colombia. He was paid just over $8,000 in bribes. Sentencing is set for 23 March.

Source: Former TD Bank employee pleads guilty to accepting bribes, laundering $4.8 million to Colombia (US Department of Justice)​

The rail manager and the missing staff.

  • Victoria's anti-corruption commission, IBAC, charged a former senior manager at Metro Trains Melbourne on 8 October with three counts of misconduct in public office and three of conspiracy to defraud.
  • IBAC alleges the manager favoured labour hire company First Call Staffing for rail-replacement bus and printing contracts between 2020 and 2023, and that the two conspired to undersupply staff for the contractor's benefit.
  • The company's former director is also charged. Both are due in Melbourne Magistrates' Court on 20 and 21 October.

Source: IBAC charges two people with conspiracy to defraud following investigation into Metro Trains Melbourne (IBAC)​

The Crime Roundup really ties back to the Headline cases. We've got people in very sensitive, critical infrastructure positions exhibiting insider behaviour, for different motives and intent. But all of these have a chance of ending in a catastrophic outcome.


AI Insider Threat Watch: One Prompt, Every Agent

  • Zenity Labs disclosed "AgentCorruption" on 8 October: a chain of flaws in Amazon Bedrock AgentCore, AWS's service for running AI agents.
  • With one prompt to a single public-facing agent, researchers took over every AgentCore agent in the same AWS account and region.
  • The agents could reach an internal AWS service that hands out temporary cloud credentials, and their default permissions were far too broad. That gave access to private conversations, source code and stored secrets, and let the researchers plant instructions in the agents' memory to send users to an attacker-controlled page.
  • AWS has patched it and tightened the defaults. Zenity still recommends giving each agent its own minimum-access role. All three parts of the lethal trifecta were there: sensitive data, untrusted content from a public prompt, and a way to send data out.

What are we learning from all of this? As security researchers, business owners and people in general: don't trust AI with personal and sensitive information. We know frontier labs are running agents that can break out of containers. We're exposing sensitive data to them, and then networking them together. We're asking for these types of data breaches.

Source: Zenity Labs discloses AgentCorruption, a chain of AWS AgentCore flaws that allowed one prompt to take over all AgentCore agents within an AWS account and region (Zenity) Source: 'AgentCorruption' puts AWS environments at risk with one prompt (Dark Reading)​


Mitigation Corner: Whose Patch Was It Anyway?

  • The FBI's cyber chief, Brett Leatherman, said on 5 October that the breach of its jobs portal came from "a security failure of a platform managed by a third-party organization". He said it happened "after a contractor failed to implement a security patch explicitly issued to secure the platform."
  • The FBI says it has removed the contractor and made multiple arrests. Exposed data included staff addresses, counterintelligence roles, and medical and psychiatric records.
  • The FBI didn't name the platform or the company. Sources told reporters it was Oracle PeopleSoft, managed by Accenture. Accenture said it was "proud to support the mission of the FBI" and didn't answer questions about the patch.

The ambiguity here is that I don't think we can make much out of this case yet. Whether an insider purposely didn't patch the system, we won't know until there's more reporting or some type of indictment from the DOJ. The FBI has obviously shifted their risk onto a contractor, and this is well known in risk assessments. Ultimately, they're the organisation that carries the risk. A patch was issued. What were their processes to follow up and make sure it was done in time, rather than missed? It can't all be on the contractor. It also comes back to the FBI not doing their due diligence, since they own the systems.

If a contractor runs a critical system for you, don't just hand over the patch. Check that it's actually been applied, on time.

Source: FBI says contractor failure led to hack of its jobs website (NBC News) Source: FBI removes Accenture contractor following employee data breach (Security Magazine)​


Trusted Profession Watch: The Ransomware Fixer Who Paid the Ransom

  • Zohar Pinhasi, 50, owner of Florida ransomware recovery firm MonsterCloud, was indicted in Brooklyn on 23 September and pleaded not guilty on 7 October. He is charged with wire fraud and wire fraud conspiracy.
  • Prosecutors allege he told victims he had proprietary tools to decrypt their data without paying the hackers. No such tool existed.
  • Instead, he allegedly paid the ransoms himself, about $8 million in total, and billed clients about $19 million. In one case he allegedly paid $8,200 and charged $150,000.

This is just horrible news for the security community. We should never be paying ransoms to ransomware operators. You just don't know what other crime is being funded through it. It's unfortunate for the organisations that trusted this company, and it's unlikely they had the technical savvy to understand it was a scam the whole time. Always ask for a second opinion. Always ask to see the software run if someone says they're running it. They can keep their proprietary information. Lots of the software we use is proprietary. But that doesn't mean it can be secretive as well.

Source: Owner of Florida ransomware remediation company charged with defrauding clients (US Attorney, E.D. New York) Source: DOJ charges ransomware recovery CEO for secretly paying hackers (The Record)​


Trivia

Germany's BND, this week's Headline agency, was founded in 1956 out of a spy network set up just after the Second World War. Who set up that network?

A) British intelligence (MI6) B) US occupation authorities C) The Soviet NKVD D) The French secret service

(Answer at the bottom.)


Corporate News

The FBI's spy hunters are short-staffed.

  • NPR reports that counterintelligence squads in many of the FBI's 56 field offices are only 50 to 60 percent staffed.
  • Agents and analysts have been moved to violent crime and immigration work, and counterintelligence vacancies aren't being backfilled.
  • The FBI disputes it. A spokesperson called the report "false" and said the bureau "maintains a robust counterintelligence operation", with more than 1,500 people on its counterintelligence task forces.

This is really sad to see, staffing at only 50 to 60 percent. While there are a lot of issues with government agencies, these are the agencies that have the legal authority to make real change and investigate the tough cases. Not just counterintelligence, but child safety, human trafficking and other really serious issues that face our society.

Source: FBI counterintelligence squads are now severely understaffed, as threats only grow (NPR)​

The Senate wants AI companies to report insider threats.

  • The Insider Threat Reporting and Security Guidance Act of 2026 (S. 5601), introduced on 29 September by Senators Jim Banks and Kirsten Gillibrand, would cover AI contractors with US defence deals worth $100 million or more.
  • They would have to report national security incidents, such as theft of model weights, within 72 hours, and report material vulnerabilities or concerning AI behaviour within seven days. They would also have to disclose who has access to model weights.
  • On 7 October, Sen. Banks wrote to War Secretary Pete Hegseth and OMB Director Russell Vought seeking funding, data access and a briefing on China-linked insider risks at frontier AI companies.

We're starting to see AI treated as critical infrastructure, at least within legislation, as it should be. That means strict and tight reporting on insider threats, vulnerabilities, data theft and any other issues relevant to the public it will affect. Especially since there aren't many major labs pushing out models, and those models are spread everywhere across lots of organisations.

Source: S. 5601, Insider Threat Reporting and Security Guidance Act of 2026 (GovInfo) Source: Sen. Banks calls for stronger protections against insider threats at frontier AI companies (Office of Sen. Jim Banks) Source: Bipartisan Senate bill would push DOD to expand its oversight of commercial frontier AI models (DefenseScoop)​

California says no to robo bosses.

  • California Governor Gavin Newsom signed SB 947, the "No Robo Bosses Act", on 30 September. It takes effect on 1 July 2027.
  • Employers can't discipline or fire a worker based solely on an automated decision system. If they mainly rely on one, a human must review and back up the decision, and the worker must be told in writing.
  • Legal commentators say it may reach insider risk and data loss tools that flag employees.

Hundred percent. Machines should not be making decisions about humans at all. There always needs to be human oversight. And the humans doing that oversight need enough understanding of the raw data to make the decision properly. It can't just be someone put in charge who makes the judgement call on whatever summary comes out. They need to understand the data sources themselves, so they can go and verify. This relates back to digital forensics, and the saying we always use in that space: trust but verify.

Source: Newsom signs McNerney's No Robo Bosses Act of 2026 requiring human oversight of AI in the workplace (California State Senate) Source: When the productivity monitor becomes the boss: California's No Robo Bosses Act and employee monitoring platforms (National Law Review)​


Updates

Quick follow-ups on stories from earlier issues.

flydubai FZ1073. In Issue #25 the motive was unknown. On 3 October the UAE's Attorney-General said investigators had established that the co-pilot "attempted to carry out a terrorist act", and that he attacked the captain with the cockpit's crash axe. He reportedly told interrogators he planned the attack before flydubai hired him. The investigation continues. Source: Flydubai co-pilot attacked captain with crash axe in 'terrorist act': UAE (Al Jazeera)​

OpenAI's safety researchers. In Issue #25 we said we wouldn't trust OpenAI's account until there was outside validation. The three researchers, Jasmine Wang, Tomek Korbak and Mikita Balesni, have now published an open letter denying they mishandled information and warning of a chilling effect on staff. Korbak says it concerned his communications with METR, the safety group OpenAI worked with on an earlier incident. OpenAI says it found "a significant breach of trust" and that the firings were "not about raising safety concerns". Separately, an OpenAI safety lead resigned, calling the company's culture "broken". Source: Fired OpenAI safety researchers dispute misconduct claims, warn of chilling effect (TechCrunch) Source: OpenAI defends decision to fire researchers (CNBC)​

ShinyHunters and the FBI. Following Issue #24 and #25, the FBI has confirmed multiple arrests. Reuters reported that a 16-year-old described as a key member was arrested in Jordan and is helping the FBI identify others. How the attackers got in is in this week's Mitigation Corner. Source: FBI confirms 'multiple' arrests related to ShinyHunters hack (The Register)​

Correction on Citizens v SoFi. In Issue #25 we said SoFi had not responded publicly. That was wrong. SoFi had already said: "We lawfully compete to recruit and retain the best talent and expect other organizations to do the same." It has since called the lawsuit "a baseless allegation". Source: Citizens Bank accuses SoFi of poaching 30 mortgage employees (Banking Dive)​


What's On

iTA Workshop: The Insider Attribution Paradox, a DTEX Insider Threat Advisory workshop.

  • When: Tuesday 27 October 2026, 1:00 PM to 2:00 PM PT (Wednesday 28 October, 6:00 AM AEST Brisbane time).
  • What it covers: how AI agents embedded in enterprise workflows complicate attribution, what OpenTelemetry can reveal about agent workflows and tool execution, closing the gap between user, agent and tool, and investigating AI-assisted activity.
  • Online, and open to the wider insider risk community.
  • Register: https://www.dtex.ai/events/ita-workshop-the-insider-attribution-paradox/​

Insider risk at AISA CyberCon 2026, Melbourne. If you're at CyberCon this week (Melbourne Convention and Exhibition Centre), four sessions are worth your time:

  • Thursday 15 October, 1:30 PM: panel, "Shadow IT, shadow AI and insider risk: Why controls fail, and culture matters more".
  • Thursday 15 October, 2:20 PM: "Insider threat alert: How AI wearables are quietly exfiltrating your corporate secrets".
  • Thursday 15 October, 4:40 PM: "The next insider threat is already inside: How generative AI quietly accumulates power across the organisation".
  • Friday 16 October, 10:55 AM: "Beyond human insiders: Emerging autonomous AI risks to organisations", Dr Anagi Gamachchi (Deakin University) and Dr Ruwan Nagahawatta, on a "Digital Insider" framework for AI agents.
  • Program: https://melbourne2026.cyberconference.com.au/schedule​

A reminder of two events from last week that are still coming up:

On the horizon: the Critical Pathway to Insider Risk Conference at Fordham University, New York, on 4 and 5 November (https://www.insiderriskgroup.com/), and the Australian Insider Risk Symposium in Sydney, a half-day event in November with the date still to be confirmed (https://www.irpa.org/event-details/australian-insider-risk-symposium).


Resources

A few places worth your time if you want to go deeper on insider risk.

Worth bookmarking:

And my own: Insider Threat Awareness Training on YouTube, a free course with certification.


Trivia Answer

B. US occupation authorities set up the "Gehlen Organization" in 1946, run by Reinhard Gehlen, the former head of the German army's intelligence branch on the Eastern Front. It became the BND in 1956, with Gehlen as its first president.

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