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Well, this has been a heavy week. I've been down a rabbit hole on some of the darkest cults being exposed around child exploitation, and child safety in general. There'll be more on this that I put out soon. I've started volunteering for an organisation that helps link children to fathers who have potentially abandoned them in developing countries, fathers who most likely conceived them through the sex tourism trade. Unfortunately, the organisation I'm volunteering with finds allegations of child sexual abuse material from people directly tied to it. We try to link those people with the legal authorities so they can investigate further, and that's proving extremely difficult. So this intro is a little longer this week. It's a bit heavy. It's been a big week. But it's nice to be working and giving back, because child predators like this are the greatest insider threat to human society. Thumbnail image: Faire Headline: The SpymastersAugust Hanning, former head of Germany's BND
David Rush, former senior US intelligence official
What links these two stories is people in very senior positions within government agencies, who go through some of the strictest vetting we have today. It's unclear whether either of them was under a continuous vetting process or the older point-in-time process. Either way, these are the strictest vetting processes in the world, and they're still missing things. Continuous monitoring is being pushed more and more, and it's something I recommend organisations do for people in these really critical positions, particularly in government and federal agencies. It should also be considered for highly sensitive or senior positions in areas like critical infrastructure. A small change to someone's financial situation or family situation can have a drastic impact on them, and lead to them becoming an insider risk. Source: Arrests for suspected treasonous espionage, spying out state secrets, attempted treason, and espionage (Federal Public Prosecutor General, Germany) Source: Former federal employee pleads guilty to defrauding the federal government of approximately $194 million (US Department of Justice) Source: CIA officer arrested with gold bars admits he exposed secret intelligence source to a foreign official (NBC News) Insider Scoop: The Shortcut Through Hong Kong
This to me seems like an opportunistic find for China, if these parts were actually in the shipment, which I guess is still unconfirmed at this point in time. My question is, with such highly classified, top secret material, why is it not being shipped with a courier that sees it from one end to the other? Is it because these parts are sent for service so often that it wouldn't be financially viable? It's hard to believe there would be a gap like this, given how sensitive it is, how long Australia has been working with the US on these aircraft, and that these parts are supposedly sent back and forth all the time. Source: UPS worker missed email, letting China get F-35 parts (Bloomberg) Source: Chinese authorities reportedly in possession of F-35 components in Hong Kong (CNBC) Crime RoundupThe nuclear safety engineer and the Houthis.
The engineer who held his own network to ransom.
The banker who unblocked the fraud flags.
The rail manager and the missing staff.
The Crime Roundup really ties back to the Headline cases. We've got people in very sensitive, critical infrastructure positions exhibiting insider behaviour, for different motives and intent. But all of these have a chance of ending in a catastrophic outcome. AI Insider Threat Watch: One Prompt, Every Agent
What are we learning from all of this? As security researchers, business owners and people in general: don't trust AI with personal and sensitive information. We know frontier labs are running agents that can break out of containers. We're exposing sensitive data to them, and then networking them together. We're asking for these types of data breaches. Source: Zenity Labs discloses AgentCorruption, a chain of AWS AgentCore flaws that allowed one prompt to take over all AgentCore agents within an AWS account and region (Zenity) Source: 'AgentCorruption' puts AWS environments at risk with one prompt (Dark Reading) Mitigation Corner: Whose Patch Was It Anyway?
The ambiguity here is that I don't think we can make much out of this case yet. Whether an insider purposely didn't patch the system, we won't know until there's more reporting or some type of indictment from the DOJ. The FBI has obviously shifted their risk onto a contractor, and this is well known in risk assessments. Ultimately, they're the organisation that carries the risk. A patch was issued. What were their processes to follow up and make sure it was done in time, rather than missed? It can't all be on the contractor. It also comes back to the FBI not doing their due diligence, since they own the systems. If a contractor runs a critical system for you, don't just hand over the patch. Check that it's actually been applied, on time. Source: FBI says contractor failure led to hack of its jobs website (NBC News) Source: FBI removes Accenture contractor following employee data breach (Security Magazine) Trusted Profession Watch: The Ransomware Fixer Who Paid the Ransom
This is just horrible news for the security community. We should never be paying ransoms to ransomware operators. You just don't know what other crime is being funded through it. It's unfortunate for the organisations that trusted this company, and it's unlikely they had the technical savvy to understand it was a scam the whole time. Always ask for a second opinion. Always ask to see the software run if someone says they're running it. They can keep their proprietary information. Lots of the software we use is proprietary. But that doesn't mean it can be secretive as well. Source: Owner of Florida ransomware remediation company charged with defrauding clients (US Attorney, E.D. New York) Source: DOJ charges ransomware recovery CEO for secretly paying hackers (The Record) TriviaGermany's BND, this week's Headline agency, was founded in 1956 out of a spy network set up just after the Second World War. Who set up that network? A) British intelligence (MI6) B) US occupation authorities C) The Soviet NKVD D) The French secret service (Answer at the bottom.) Corporate NewsThe FBI's spy hunters are short-staffed.
This is really sad to see, staffing at only 50 to 60 percent. While there are a lot of issues with government agencies, these are the agencies that have the legal authority to make real change and investigate the tough cases. Not just counterintelligence, but child safety, human trafficking and other really serious issues that face our society. Source: FBI counterintelligence squads are now severely understaffed, as threats only grow (NPR) The Senate wants AI companies to report insider threats.
We're starting to see AI treated as critical infrastructure, at least within legislation, as it should be. That means strict and tight reporting on insider threats, vulnerabilities, data theft and any other issues relevant to the public it will affect. Especially since there aren't many major labs pushing out models, and those models are spread everywhere across lots of organisations. Source: S. 5601, Insider Threat Reporting and Security Guidance Act of 2026 (GovInfo) Source: Sen. Banks calls for stronger protections against insider threats at frontier AI companies (Office of Sen. Jim Banks) Source: Bipartisan Senate bill would push DOD to expand its oversight of commercial frontier AI models (DefenseScoop) California says no to robo bosses.
Hundred percent. Machines should not be making decisions about humans at all. There always needs to be human oversight. And the humans doing that oversight need enough understanding of the raw data to make the decision properly. It can't just be someone put in charge who makes the judgement call on whatever summary comes out. They need to understand the data sources themselves, so they can go and verify. This relates back to digital forensics, and the saying we always use in that space: trust but verify. Source: Newsom signs McNerney's No Robo Bosses Act of 2026 requiring human oversight of AI in the workplace (California State Senate) Source: When the productivity monitor becomes the boss: California's No Robo Bosses Act and employee monitoring platforms (National Law Review) UpdatesQuick follow-ups on stories from earlier issues. flydubai FZ1073. In Issue #25 the motive was unknown. On 3 October the UAE's Attorney-General said investigators had established that the co-pilot "attempted to carry out a terrorist act", and that he attacked the captain with the cockpit's crash axe. He reportedly told interrogators he planned the attack before flydubai hired him. The investigation continues. Source: Flydubai co-pilot attacked captain with crash axe in 'terrorist act': UAE (Al Jazeera) OpenAI's safety researchers. In Issue #25 we said we wouldn't trust OpenAI's account until there was outside validation. The three researchers, Jasmine Wang, Tomek Korbak and Mikita Balesni, have now published an open letter denying they mishandled information and warning of a chilling effect on staff. Korbak says it concerned his communications with METR, the safety group OpenAI worked with on an earlier incident. OpenAI says it found "a significant breach of trust" and that the firings were "not about raising safety concerns". Separately, an OpenAI safety lead resigned, calling the company's culture "broken". Source: Fired OpenAI safety researchers dispute misconduct claims, warn of chilling effect (TechCrunch) Source: OpenAI defends decision to fire researchers (CNBC) ShinyHunters and the FBI. Following Issue #24 and #25, the FBI has confirmed multiple arrests. Reuters reported that a 16-year-old described as a key member was arrested in Jordan and is helping the FBI identify others. How the attackers got in is in this week's Mitigation Corner. Source: FBI confirms 'multiple' arrests related to ShinyHunters hack (The Register) Correction on Citizens v SoFi. In Issue #25 we said SoFi had not responded publicly. That was wrong. SoFi had already said: "We lawfully compete to recruit and retain the best talent and expect other organizations to do the same." It has since called the lawsuit "a baseless allegation". Source: Citizens Bank accuses SoFi of poaching 30 mortgage employees (Banking Dive) What's OniTA Workshop: The Insider Attribution Paradox, a DTEX Insider Threat Advisory workshop.
Insider risk at AISA CyberCon 2026, Melbourne. If you're at CyberCon this week (Melbourne Convention and Exhibition Centre), four sessions are worth your time:
A reminder of two events from last week that are still coming up:
On the horizon: the Critical Pathway to Insider Risk Conference at Fordham University, New York, on 4 and 5 November (https://www.insiderriskgroup.com/), and the Australian Insider Risk Symposium in Sydney, a half-day event in November with the date still to be confirmed (https://www.irpa.org/event-details/australian-insider-risk-symposium). ResourcesA few places worth your time if you want to go deeper on insider risk.
Worth bookmarking:
And my own: Insider Threat Awareness Training on YouTube, a free course with certification. Trivia AnswerB. US occupation authorities set up the "Gehlen Organization" in 1946, run by Reinhard Gehlen, the former head of the German army's intelligence branch on the Eastern Front. It became the BND in 1956, with Gehlen as its first president. |
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