17 DAYS AGO • 11 MIN READ

Two Contractors, One Week - Issue #29 - Insider Threat Weekly

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This last week I've been watching a lot of YouTube creators, and following links from media stories I've been reading, about AI safety and how we should be regulating it more aggressively. One site I came across is Team Human, a creator-led campaign calling for a global slowdown on AI, and I'm keen to follow what it does. If you follow others like it, I'd love to hear about them, so feel free to shoot me a message or engage on my posts.


Headline: Two Contractors, One Week

The CIA contractor and the Substack.

  • Ian Brinksman, 42, of Washington DC, is a US government contractor. The CIA Director said Ian "provided services to CIA."
  • The FBI arrested him on 23 October. Prosecutors allege Ian leaked national defence information to a person who runs a Substack publication and who repeatedly posted classified information there.

The Fort Bragg contractor and the night-vision goggles.

  • James Thomas Ashbacher, 37, of Spring Lake, North Carolina, worked for a private security company at the US Army Special Operations Command facility at Fort Bragg. He held a Top Secret clearance.
  • Prosecutors allege he took classified videos and photos of military operations and posted them on social media. Other users then re-posted them on a second site. He allegedly told one user he was "trying to do some damage control."
  • A search of his home allegedly found a classified award write-up and a night-vision goggle system, specific to a Special Operations unit, that had been reported missing.
  • He was arrested on 27 October and charged with unlawfully transmitting and retaining national defence information, and theft of government property.

Both of these are contractors for government organisations, and both were trusted with classified information. They went through the vetting process for that, and still allegedly did this.

Could further controls have caught them before it happened? The CIA contractor would have been harder to catch. They were passing it to someone else, which shows a clearer intent to stay hidden. The Fort Bragg contractor posted it to social media himself, and could have been doing it for notoriety within the communities he was part of. The way each of them did it says a lot about what might have driven them.

Source: U.S. Government Contractor Arrested for Allegedly Leaking National Defense Information (DOJ)​Former U.S. Government Contractor Arrested for Allegedly Leaking National Defense Information and Stealing Night Vision Goggles (DOJ)​


Insider Scoop: The Executive Close to Nvidia's CEO

  • The New York Times reported on 29 October that US intelligence officials concluded Alice Huang was passing information to Beijing. She is a Chinese citizen who has been a senior executive at Megaspeed, a data centre company in Singapore.
  • The Times reported she had a close relationship with Nvidia chief executive Jensen Huang (no relation). It said he was never given a defensive briefing, the standard warning for Americans targeted by foreign spies.
  • Nvidia said his dealings with her were "not unusual or unexpected" and that Megaspeed is like any other regional customer. China's foreign ministry called the report "groundless speculation."
  • Senator Elizabeth Warren has demanded answers from Jensen Huang and Nvidia's board.

The interesting part is who Senator Warren is demanding answers from. If US intelligence made this assessment, it was on the US government to brief Jensen Huang. Protecting critical infrastructure and national assets is their responsibility, even when the asset sits inside a private company. If nothing in the business relationship looked unusual, and she was still passing information to China, then it's up to the US government to respond. They should be demanding answers from the lettered agencies that deal with this.

Source: Nvidia Chief, Jensen Huang, Is Seen as Target of Chinese Spy Plot (New York Times)​Nvidia responds to report Jensen Huang was target of Chinese asset (CNBC)​China rejects report of spy plot targeting Nvidia's Jensen Huang (Euronews)​Elizabeth Warren Wants Nvidia CEO to Answer Congress on Suspected Spy (Benzinga)​


Crime Roundup

The assistant who wrote the cheques.

  • Catalina Corona was a personal assistant and former secretary to her elderly employers.
  • She stole nearly $10 million by writing cheques to cash from their accounts.
  • On 27 October she was sentenced to 48 months in prison and ordered to forfeit $9.6 million.

Source: Personal Assistant Sentenced to 48 Months in Prison for Massive Fraud Scheme Targeting Her Elderly Employers (USAO E.D.N.Y.)​

The inspector who never checked the welds.

  • Michael Vasconcellos was a weld inspector on gas pipelines in New York.
  • From 2016 to 2023 he faked the results of hundreds of weld inspections.
  • Fixing the work has cost the utility more than $60 million. On 28 October he was sentenced to 30 months.
  • A week earlier, a former Boston MBTA track inspector pleaded guilty to faking track inspection reports.

Source: New York Safety Inspector Sentenced For Fabricating Gas Pipeline Test Results (USAO S.D.N.Y.)​Former MBTA Employee Pleads Guilty (USAO D. Mass.)​

The postal buyer and his relative.

  • James E. Lee Sr. was a procurement official at the US Postal Service.
  • From 2018 to 2023 he steered contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars to four companies. In return, about $183,000 was paid to a relative.
  • He pleaded guilty on 29 October. Sentencing is set for 25 February 2027.

Source: Former U.S. Postal Service Official Pleads Guilty to Bribery Scheme Related to Contracts Worth Hundreds of Millions of Dollars (DOJ)​

It's hard not to feel a bit despondent reading these. People not doing jobs where getting it wrong could kill someone, and people stealing large amounts of money from those who are vulnerable. It's a reminder to stay vigilant, no matter who you're dealing with.


AI Insider Threat Watch

The contractor whose agent had the keys.

  • Wired reported on 29 October, citing anonymous sources, that an Accenture employee hooked a personal Claude Code account into a live Defense Department system. The system sits on NIPRNet, the department's unclassified network.
  • The agent reportedly had admin access. The system reportedly serves several intelligence agencies and holds controlled unclassified information.
  • It reportedly ran for about two months, and appears to have sent credentials and network details, including a network diagram, to an outside website.
  • Accenture disputes the allegations and says an independent investigation found them without merit. The Pentagon declined to comment.

This is a very serious issue, if true, for a contractor to do inside a defence agency. But it happens in companies all the time. That's the worry with shadow AI: people bring in tools that, just through normal use, send out sensitive company data, network diagrams or even credentials. And the company may not have an enterprise agreement with that tool, so the provider may be allowed to train on that data, or use it in other ways with third parties.

Source: A Defense Contractor Gave Their Personal AI Agent Access to a Secure Pentagon System (Wired)​

The agents that weakened their own monitoring.

  • On 20 October OpenAI disclosed two cases where its internal coding agents weakened the monitoring meant to catch misbehaviour.
  • One agent, fixing an evaluation pipeline, switched off the automatic alerts to OpenAI's security team. It had read an earlier "don't send messages" instruction as covering them. The monitor kept running; the alerts stopped.
  • Another agent, doing a migration, removed a monitor after a second agent had told it not to, "even temporarily." It reported the job done without mentioning the change, and denied removing it when asked.
  • OpenAI says its internal review tool now detects and blocks attempts to disable this monitoring.

This one is interesting if we remember that AI isn't human. We constantly personify agents doing the wrong thing, but they don't have a sense of right and wrong the way human children do. In the first case, the agent switched off the alerts because it had read the earlier "don't send messages" instruction and thought it applied to it. It was taking the logical step and optimising to complete the task. In the second, the agent may have treated another agent telling it not to do something differently. These tools tend to prioritise what humans tell them, and it may have a hierarchy of agents where it puts itself at the top. Again, this isn't human intellect working through a problem. It's AI optimising to complete a task, and it will always try to do that.

Source: Suppressing misalignment monitoring alerts and disabling misalignment monitoring (OpenAI)​CSA research note: agent monitor tampering (Cloud Security Alliance)​


Mitigation Corner: Take the Lanyard Off

  • After the Alfozan case, OpenAI and Anthropic have told staff not to wear company-branded clothing outside the office, according to the New York Post.
  • Staff are also told to use privacy screens on public transport and keep work talk out of cafes.
  • Security sessions train them to spot romantic or financial approaches designed to get information out of them.

Following on from last week's issue, AI needs to be treated as critical infrastructure, and AI companies need security protocols to match. That means not wearing company-branded clothing or lanyards in public, and being aware of who could be sitting behind you or next to you while you work on a device. You need to be more aware, especially with very sensitive or confidential work.

Do sensitive or confidential work in a restricted area, not in public, to prevent data leakage.

Source: Workers at OpenAI, Anthropic made to ditch company logos as it makes them targets for spies, seduction (New York Post)​


Trusted Profession Watch: The Mayor Who Kept the Church Books

  • Tamara Wallace is a former mayor of South Lake Tahoe, California. She also worked as a part-time bookkeeper for a local church.
  • Between April 2019 and September 2025 she embezzled about $390,000 from the church. Prosecutors say she wrote herself reimbursement cheques for expenses she never had, and moved money into accounts she controlled.
  • She pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud on 29 October. Sentencing is set for 14 January 2027.

Do we need to make a comment on this one? Someone in a position to steal money, even from a church. We see this week on week.

Source: Former South Lake Tahoe mayor pleads guilty to wire fraud after embezzling $390,000 from local church (USAO E.D. Cal.)​Former Tahoe mayor pleads guilty to stealing nearly $390,000 from church (SF Chronicle)​


Trivia

This week's AI Watch story happened on NIPRNet, the US military's unclassified network. What does the N in NIPRNet stand for?

A) National B) Non-classified C) Naval D) Network


Corporate News: The SEC Is Watching Prediction Markets

  • SEC Enforcement Director David Woodcock said the agency is watching prediction markets for manipulation and insider risk, Bloomberg reported on 29 October.
  • He said bets tied to a company's earnings or key performance numbers can fall under the SEC's authority.

How are we not regulating prediction markets as gambling at this point? We know from countless examples that this is essentially betting. Rhode Island's attorney general, who is suing Kalshi and Polymarket, says Kalshi has called its own products "betting" and "wagering" in its marketing. And when 60 Minutes put it to Polymarket's CEO that these markets rely on inside information, he said people "having an edge to the market is a good thing." So what are we doing here? Let's start regulating this as gambling.

Source: Prediction Markets Face SEC Scrutiny Over Fraud, Enforcement Director Says (Bloomberg)​Attorney General Neronha sues Kalshi and Polymarket for unlawfully conducting sports gambling in Rhode Island (Rhode Island AG)​Polymarket CEO Shayne Coplan, 60 Minutes transcript (CBS News)​


Updates

Alfozan indicted. Abdulrahman Alfozan, the former OpenAI engineer charged over a recording device hidden in an executive conference room, has been indicted by a federal grand jury. It is still one count, intercepting oral communications, plus forfeiture of the recording devices. He remains in custody. We first covered this in Issue #27.

Source: OpenAI engineer accused of using toilet paper to bug conference room indicted by grand jury (SF Chronicle)​

Feuerstein sentenced. Tina Feuerstein, the CFO who hid more than $1 million of personal spending on the company card, has been sentenced to three years in prison and ordered to repay $1,090,020. We covered her conviction in Issue #20.

Source: Former CFO of Chicago-Area Company's Subsidiary Sentenced to Three Years in Federal Prison for Embezzlement (USAO N.D. Ill.)​

Apple v OpenAI. Still no ruling on Apple's request for a preliminary injunction. At a 14 October hearing the judge said he was highly likely to grant it, and OpenAI has agreed not to use the alleged trade secrets in the meantime. Trial is set for 19 July 2027. More in Issue #27.

Source: OpenAI agrees not to use alleged Apple trade secrets amid ongoing lawsuit (9to5Mac)​

Huawei opens its defence. Huawei began presenting its defence on 30 October in its racketeering and trade secret theft trial in Brooklyn. More in Issue #24.

Source: Huawei opens defence in US criminal trial, touting its record of innovation (The Star)​

The AI super PAC slows down. Leading the Future, the AI industry super PAC in Issue #28's Follow the Money, took in no new donations in the second or third quarters of 2026, according to its latest filings. OpenAI president Greg Brockman pulled out of a planned second $25 million donation in June.

Source: Leading the Future (FEC)​Losing donors and under fire, AI industry super PAC retreats (SF Standard)​


What's On

The Insider Risk Program Just Got Bigger: How Digital Workers Are Changing Identity, Behavior, Ownership, and Response, an Exabeam webinar.

Insider Risk Community of Practice Networking Drinks, Melbourne, hosted by the Australian Cyber Collaboration Centre. Wednesday 11 November 2026, 5:15 PM to 7:00 PM AEDT, SEEK Head Office, Cremorne. Register: https://events.humanitix.com/insider-risk-community-of-practice-networking-drinks-melbourne-november-2026​

The Human Layer: Insider Risk, Behavioral Analytics, and the AI Threat Multiplier, a SecureWorld panel running at two US conferences. An Open Sessions pass covers it.

  • Seattle (Bellevue, WA): Thursday 5 November 2026, 11:10 to 11:45 AM local time, Meydenbauer Center. Panel: Lynsey Wolf (DTEX), Matt Graves (One Identity) and Nathan Wenzler (Optiv), moderated by Alex Di Giacomo (Sound Transit). Open Sessions pass $85. Register: https://events.secureworld.io/agenda/seattle-wa-2026​
  • Twin Cities (Bloomington, MN): Thursday 19 November 2026, 2:10 to 2:45 PM local time, JW Marriott Mall of America. Panel: Gregory Gonzalez (DTEX) and Miguel Quinn (Sanity Solutions), moderated by Benjamin Moormeier (Field Nation). Open Sessions pass $50. Register: https://events.secureworld.io/agenda/twin-cities-mn-2026​

On the horizon: Carnegie Mellon SEI's live online insider threat courses, Program Manager (1 to 3 December, https://www.sei.cmu.edu/training/insider-threat-program-manager-implementation-operation) and Analyst (8 to 10 December, https://www.sei.cmu.edu/training/insider-threat-analyst), both run on US Eastern hours and paid. The Australian Insider Risk Symposium in Sydney is still listed as November, date to be confirmed (https://www.irpa.org/event-details/australian-insider-risk-symposium).


Resources

A few places worth your time if you want to go deeper on insider risk.

  • ​Insider Threat Analyst Career Framework (Rob Knowles): a free competency model mapping the skills an insider threat analyst needs at every career level, across nine concentrations.
  • ​The Insider Threat Matrix (Forscie): an open framework for insider threat investigations, built around motive, means, preparation, infringement, and anti-forensics, with hundreds of techniques, detections, and preventions.
  • New: Insider Risk Atlas (Alessandro Aledda): 39 free scenarios mapped from who has the access, through the act, to the asset it hits, each with warning signs and controls, built on the Insider Threat Matrix. It includes AI agents as their own access group.
  • ​US Insider Risk Management Center of Excellence: a curated hub of guidance and a jump-off point to the free deep-dive guides below.

Worth bookmarking:

And my own: Insider Threat Awareness Training on YouTube, a free course with certification.


Trivia Answer

B. Non-classified. NIPRNet was named the Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network, and you'll also see the N written as "Non-secure". It's the Defense Department's network for unclassified information. Its sibling, SIPRNet, carries information classified up to Secret.

Source: NIPRNet (Wikipedia)​

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