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The Security Chief Was the Hacker - Issue #24 - Insider Threat Weekly

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Interesting week this week, as AI continues to embed itself into our stories, our organisations and our personal lives. Even in insider risk and threat, it feels like each week there is a new story to talk about.

There are always different avenues for insider risk. This goes back to what I do day to day, when we run the workshops every six weeks. Each time there's a new, novel way AI can be used for data exfiltration, either by a human or by the agents themselves.

I think we're still before the horizon of large-scale breaches, particularly AI being weaponised by criminal gangs or nation-state actors.


Headline: The Security Chief Was the Hacker

  • Israel's State Attorney's Office indicted Michael "Miki" Bar, 43, on 10 September. He was chief information security officer at Hamat Group. Hamat says the charges relate to his private activity and he no longer works there.
  • Prosecutors allege he planted malware in 26 companies, two kibbutzim and the computers of private individuals, and ran it from 2019 until his arrest in August. It stole passwords and business files, and switched on cameras and microphones, including in bedrooms and a hotel room.
  • On 30 April the National Cyber Directorate asked him, as Hamat's security chief, to help investigate a wider attack. It gave him a tool to find the malware. Prosecutors say he was the attacker, and hid it through about two weeks of talks with investigators.
  • After learning his malware had been found, he allegedly built a more advanced version, partly with AI tools including Claude, and used it on more companies.

What a complex case. This is a trusted insider from a cyber investigation standpoint. He was brought in to help investigate a breach, then allegedly took that information and used it to improve the malware he was building. The investigators thought they were handing it to someone on their side. There is also an insider angle in who he targeted: people in the community, reached through these organisations. These types of insiders are potentially the most dangerous ones out there.

Source: Israeli cyber manager accused of remotely accessing cameras, stealing passwords and infiltrating 26 companies (CTech by Calcalist) Source: מנהל אבטחת מידע בקבוצת חמת מואשם במאות עבירות סייבר (N12, Hebrew)​


Insider Scoop: Hackers Claim the FBI's Own Staff List

  • On 22 September the ShinyHunters group claimed it had breached the FBI and stolen 2-3 terabytes of data on current and former staff and job applicants.
  • Reuters reviewed a 5,000-line sample. It lists names, home addresses, phone numbers, dates of birth, Social Security numbers and emergency contacts. Some entries show field office assignments and units doing intelligence or counterespionage work.
  • The FBI says it "is aware of claims regarding unauthorized activity affecting FBIjobs.gov and is currently investigating." Reuters could not establish that the data came from FBI systems.
  • The group says it is not after money. It wants the FBI to retract a May 2026 warning that described its harassment and swatting tactics.

The insider angle here is the exposed staff in counterintelligence roles. If the data is real, foreign intelligence services could use it to blackmail or leverage them. Having their personal details out there makes them more visible targets, and their families too. The exposure of them and their families can be used to leverage them into insider activity.

Source: Exclusive: Hacked FBI data has sensitive information about employees' intelligence roles (Reuters via Yahoo News) Source: Hacking group ShinyHunters claims it breached the FBI, stole agents' and applicants' data (TechCrunch)​


The Politicians and the Pandemic Money

Lawrence mayor Brian DePeña

  • A federal grand jury indicted Lawrence, Massachusetts mayor Brian DePeña, 61, on four counts of wire fraud and seven of money laundering. The indictment was announced on 26 August, after his arrest on 14 August.
  • Prosecutors allege his tyre business's COVID disaster loan grew from $150,000 in June 2020 to more than $1.65 million by October 2021. He was elected mayor in November 2021.
  • They say about $883,000 went to private lenders, $85,000 to his personal tax debt, and more than $130,000 to his mayoral campaign.
  • On 24 September a state grand jury added 15 charges: 14 of distributing a secretly recorded City Hall conversation, and one of witness intimidation.

Source: Massachusetts Mayor Indicted by Federal Grand Jury for Pandemic Loan Fraud and Money Laundering (US Attorney, D. Mass.) Source: Lawrence mayor hit with second indictment this summer, now over alleged wiretapping (WBUR)​

Massachusetts state representative Francisco Paulino

  • A federal grand jury indicted Massachusetts state representative Francisco Paulino, 46, of Methuen, on eight counts of wire fraud and three of money laundering. He was arrested on 26 August.
  • Prosecutors allege he obtained more than $700,000 in pandemic unemployment benefits and disaster loans in 2020 and 2021, before his election in 2023.
  • Part of it was unemployment benefits claimed in the name of a 77-year-old relative who did not know. More than $44,000 was paid out.
  • He allegedly used his own tax preparation firm, Madison Tax, to produce false revenue figures for a loan application.

Source: Massachusetts State Representative Charged With Pandemic Loan Fraud and Money Laundering (US Attorney, D. Mass.) Source: State Rep Charged with Pandemic Loan Fraud and Money Laundering (Massachusetts Inspector General)​

Again, two stories of people in positions where misuse of funds is involved. We see this week on week. These happen where there is no oversight or checking at the time, and it is only when investigations happen that they are uncovered. DePeña's second case, secretly recording staff and sharing it, plus allegedly intimidating a witness, is potentially another example of malicious insider behaviour. Illegal means used to cover things up or swing situations his way.


Crime Roundup

The payroll manager and the fake garnishments.

  • Brigit Marshall, 49, ran HR and payroll at a Minnesota truck dealership. She was sentenced on 22 September to 21 months in prison for wire fraud.
  • From 2017 to May 2025 she created fake wage garnishments in the payroll system and paid them to herself, over $1.2 million.
  • She hid it with separate general ledgers and by burying the transfers in legitimate payments. The money funded personal spending and a gambling addiction.

Source: Woman Sentenced to 21 Months' Imprisonment for Embezzling $1.2 Million from Employer (US Attorney, D. Minnesota)​

The contractor whose access outlived the job.

  • Kevin D. Mickie, 47, of Stafford, Virginia, pleaded guilty to theft of government property, announced on 16 September.
  • As a contractor managing Defense Travel System profiles, he swapped travellers' bank details for his own and created fake travel vouchers, diverting $107,316.82 in Department of War travel funds.
  • He left the job in February 2023. The money kept coming until January 2024, because the account holders had not noticed. Sentencing is set for 14 January 2027.

Source: Government contractor pleads guilty to embezzling travel reimbursement funds (US Attorney, E.D. Virginia)​

The teller with the old withdrawal slips.

  • Memphis police arrested Demeries Coplin Brooks, 24, a First Bank teller, around 1 September.
  • According to the arrest affidavit, he used old withdrawal slips to take $60,000 in cash from customer accounts between December 2023 and February 2024.
  • In August 2025 the Federal Reserve barred him from banking, after he entered pretrial diversion over thefts at an earlier job at Regions Bank.

Source: Bank teller accused of stealing $60K from customer accounts, per affidavit (Action News 5) Source: Federal Reserve letter to Demeries Brooks, 12 August 2025​

Again, we see people who had access to money, or the management of it, in their jobs. They all went unnoticed for some time while they enriched themselves and stole from their organisation or from others.


AI Insider Threat Watch: The Agent That Didn't Take No for an Answer

  • On 18 June an OpenAI agent got into a Medicare statistics portal run by Services Australia, during an internal OpenAI test. It was researching public medicine spending.
  • It hit repeated blocks and got around them. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said it "didn't accept no for an answer". It reached non-public files, including health statistics and internal file names, but no personal Medicare records.
  • OpenAI found it in August and emailed a general Services Australia inbox on 10 September. Albanese announced it on 24 September and called the notification "unacceptable".
  • A taskforce with the Australian Signals Directorate and the AI Safety Institute is reviewing it. OpenAI says its models "took actions we did not intend".

There's a lot of news and noise around this story at the moment. From an insider risk perspective, if these agents are going off and doing things that are unintended, we should be training them to behave like proper penetration testers rather than insiders. If they do breach a system while trying to find information, then instead of just getting the information and leaving, they should go through a process of responsible disclosure. That way we're not waiting a month for companies like OpenAI to report them to the government or the organisation that was hacked.

Source: OpenAI hacked Medicare portal, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese says (ABC News) Source: OpenAI agents 'infiltrated Australian government website' (The Register)​


Mitigation Corner: Speed Is the Whole Game

  • Ponemon's 2026 Cost of Insider Risks report puts the average annual cost of insider incidents at US$19.5 million, up from $17.4 million in 2024.
  • Organisations take an average of 67 days to contain an incident, down from 86 in 2023.
  • Contain it within 30 days and the average cost is $14.2 million a year. Take more than 90 days and it is $21.9 million.
  • Organisations with an insider risk programme avoided an average of seven incidents in 12 months, roughly $8.2 million in avoided cost.

The metric to put in front of the board is time-to-contain, not number of alerts.

Disclosure: I work for DTEX, and DTEX sponsored this report.

Source: 2026 Cost of Insider Risks Global Report (Ponemon Institute and DTEX) Source: Ponemon Cost of Insider Risks: Key Findings 2026 (DTEX)​


Trusted Profession Watch: The Nurse and the Five Residents

  • South Carolina's Attorney General charged Joanne Claus, 70, of Bishopville, a licensed practical nurse. She was booked into Kershaw County Detention Center on 23 September.
  • She is accused of obtaining hydrocodone, a prescription opioid, from five residents of Karesh Long Term Care and Rehab in Camden between April and July 2026.
  • She faces five counts of exploitation of a vulnerable adult and five of obtaining a controlled substance by fraud.

This is another example of a person in a trusted position abusing that position for their own benefit, and potentially hurting those in vulnerable positions. This week is a good opportunity to point to a really interesting podcast called The Retrievals. It covers a very similar situation, but the vulnerable people are women undergoing IVF treatment in the US. Here's the link if you would like to listen to the series.

Listen: The Retrievals (Serial Productions and The New York Times, on Spotify)​

Source: Attorney General Alan Wilson announces nurse charged with stealing drugs from patients (South Carolina Attorney General)​


Trivia

The Australian Signals Directorate is part of the taskforce reviewing the OpenAI Medicare breach. What is ASD's motto?

A) Always vigilant, never seen B) Know the enemy, guard the gate C) Reveal their secrets, protect our own D) In silence, strength

(Answer at the bottom.)


Updates

Quick follow-ups on stories from earlier issues.

Correction on the Huawei trial. In Issue #23 we said Huawei pleaded not guilty to 14 counts, with jury selection on 9 September. Four days before trial, prosecutors dropped two sanctions counts, so 12 counts went to the jury. Jury selection began on 8 September, with opening statements on the 9th. Source: United States v. Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., 1:18-cr-00457 (E.D.N.Y.), docket (CourtListener)​


Resources

A few places worth your time if you want to go deeper on insider risk.

Worth bookmarking:

And my own: Insider Threat Awareness Training on YouTube, a free course with certification.


Trivia Answer

C, "Reveal their secrets, protect our own." ASD began as the Defence Signals Bureau in Melbourne on 1 April 1947 and took its current name in 2013. This week it is on the other side of that motto, working out how an AI agent got to government files it was never meant to see.

Source: History (Australian Signals Directorate)​

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